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#import "../lib.typ": todo, APK
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#import "../lib.typ": todo, APK, etal, ART, eg, jm-note
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#import "@preview/diagraph:0.3.3": raw-render
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== Android Reverse Engineering Techniques <sec:bg-techniques>
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@ -123,6 +123,8 @@ On the other hand, `UrlRequest.start()` send a request to an external server, ma
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If a data-flow is found linking `TelephonyManager.getImei()` to `UrlRequest.start()`, this means the application is potentially leaking a critical information to an external entity, a behavior that is probably not wanted by the user.
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Data-flow analysis is the subject of many contribution@weiAmandroidPreciseGeneral2014 @titzeAppareciumRevealingData2015 @bosuCollusiveDataLeak2017 @klieberAndroidTaintFlow2014 @DBLPconfndssGordonKPGNR15 @octeauCompositeConstantPropagation2015 @liIccTADetectingInterComponent2015, the most notable source being Flowdroid@Arzt2014a.
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#todo[Describe the different contributions in relations to the issues they tackle]
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Static analysis is powerfull as it allows to detects unwanted behavior in an application even is the behavior does not manifest itself when running the application.
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Hovewer, static analysis tools must overcom many challenges when analysing Android applications:
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/ the Java object-oriented paradigm: A call to a method can in fact correspond to a call to any method overriding the original method in subclasses
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@ -135,18 +137,50 @@ Hovewer, static analysis tools must overcom many challenges when analysing Andro
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The tools can share the backend used to interact with the bytecode.
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For example, Apktool is often called in a subprocess to extracte the bytecode, and the Soot framework is a commonly used both to analyse bytecode and modify it.
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The most notable user of Soot is Flowdroid.
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The most notable user of Soot is Flowdroid. #todo[formulation]
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=== Dynamic Analysis <sec:bg-dynamic>
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#todo[y a du boulot]
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The alternative to static analysis is dynamic analysis.
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With dynamic analysis, the application is actually executed.
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The most simple strategies consist in just running the application and examining its behavior.
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For instance, Shao #etal #todo[cit] capture the network communication of an application and analyse those traces, while Bhatia #etal #todo[cit] take #jm-note[periodic][meh] snapshots of the memory to deduce the beavior of the application #todo[check the papers].
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More advanced methods are more intrusive and require modifing either the #APK, the Android framework, runtime, or kernel.
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TaintDroid #todo[cit] for example modify the Dalvik Virtual Machine (the predecessor of the #ART) to track the data flow of an application at runtime, while AndroBlare #todo[cit] try to compute the taint flow by hooking system calls from a kernel module. #todo[check papers]
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#todo[RealDroid?]
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Modifying the Android framwork, runtime or kernel is possible thanks to the Android project beeing opensource, however this is delicate operation.
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Thus, a common issue faced by tools that took this approach is that they are stuck with a specific version of Android.
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DroidScope@droidscope180237 and CopperDroid@Tam2015 are two well known sandbox faced with this issue. #todo[check, and add android version]
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To limit this problem, other sandbox focus on hooking strategies, like DroidHook and Mirage #todo[cit, check paper], based on the Xposed framework, and CamoDroid #todo[cit and check], based on Frida.
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Another known challenge when analysing an application dynamically is the code coverage: if some part of the application is not executed, it cannot be annalysed.
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Considering that Android applications are meant to interact with a user, this can become problematic for automatic analysis.
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#todo[runner considered]
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GroddDroid use static analysis to use static analysis to find suspicious code section and then use this information to guide a runner that uses the #todo[whatisnameagain?] framework to triger those suspicious section of code.
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More challenging, some application will try to detect is they are in a sandbox environnement (#eg if they are in an emmulator, or if Frida is present in memory) and will refuse to run some sections of code if this is the case.
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#todo[name] #etal @ruggia_unmasking_2024 make a list of evation techniques.
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They show that most current analysis framework failled to hide themself correctly and introduce a new sandbox, DroidDungeon, that do avoid detection. #todo[limitation?]
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#todo[force execution?]
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// Shao et al. Yuru Shao, Jason Ott, Yunhan Jack Jia, Zhiyun Qian, and Z Morley Mao. ‘The Misuse of Android Unix Domain Sockets and Security Implications’. In: ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. Vienna, Austria: ACM, Oct. 2016, pp. 80–91.
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// Bhatia et al. Rohit Bhatia, Brendan Saltaformaggio, Seung Jei Yang, Aisha Ali-Gombe, Xiangyu Zhang, Dongyan Xu, and Golden G Richard III. ‘"Tipped Off by Your Memory Allocator": Device-Wide User Activity Sequencing from Android Memory Images’. In: (Feb. 2018).
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- #todo[evasion: droid DroidDungeon @ruggia_unmasking_2024]
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- #todo[DroidScope@droidscope180237 and CopperDroid@Tam2015]
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- #todo[Xposed: DroidHook / Mirage: Toward a stealthier and modular malware analysis sandbox for android]
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- #todo[Frida: CamoDroid]
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- #todo[modified android framework: RealDroid]
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- #todo[
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modified android framework, framework or kernel:
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- RealDroid
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- AndroBlare, taint analysis, linux module to hook syscalls, c'est maison
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Radoniaina Andriatsimandefitra and Valérie Viet Triem Tong. ‘Detection and identification of Android malware based on information flow monitoring’. In: 2nd International Conference on Cyber Security and
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Cloud Computing. New York, USA: IEEE, Jan. 2015, pp. 200–203.
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Radoniaina Andriatsimandefitra, Stéphane Geller, and Valérie Viet Triem Tong. ‘Designing information flow policies for Android’s operating system’. In: IEEE International conference on communications.Ottawa, ON, Canada: IEEE, June 2012, pp. 976–981.
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- TaintDroid (check if dynamic? strange, cf Reaves et al) modifies the Dalvik Virtual Machine (DVM) interpreter to manage taint
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]
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=== Hybrid Analysis <sec:bg-hybrid>
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#todo[merge with other section?]
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- #todo[DyDroid, audit of Dynamic Code Loading@qu_dydroid_2017]
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