midskip
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Jean-Marie 'Histausse' Mineau 2025-10-04 00:29:34 +02:00
parent de9674f09c
commit 96b8d24b29
Signed by: histausse
GPG key ID: B66AEEDA9B645AD2
13 changed files with 26 additions and 24 deletions

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@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
#import "../lib.typ": eg, paragraph, DFG, DEX, API, SDK, APK, ART, AOSP
#import "../lib.typ": eg, paragraph, DFG, DEX, API, SDK, APK, ART, AOSP, midskip
#import "../lib.typ": todo, jfl-note
#import "X_var.typ": *
@ -257,7 +257,7 @@ Flowdroid does have a record of #SDK classes, and gives priority to the actual #
Unfortunately, Flowdroid does not have a record of all platform classes, meaning that using #hidec breaks the flow tracking.
Solving this issue would require finding the bytecode of all the platform classes of the Android version targeted, and, as we said previously, it requires extracting this information from the emulator or phone.
#v(2em)
#midskip
We have seen that tools can be impacted by shadow attacks. In the next section, we will investigate whether these attacks are used in the wild.

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@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
#import "../lib.typ": num, todo, paragraph, SDK, APK, API, ART, DEX
#import "../lib.typ": num, todo, paragraph, SDK, APK, API, ART, DEX, midskip
#import "X_var.typ": *
== Shadow Attacks in the Wild <sec:cl-wild>
@ -285,7 +285,7 @@ When looking at this new code stored in the field, we found that it does almost
Thus, we believe that the developer has upgraded their obfuscation techniques, replacing a native library with inline base64 encoded bytecode.
The shadow attack could be unintentional, but it strengthens the masking of the new implementation.
#v(2em)
#midskip
As a conclusion, we observed that:
- #SDK shadowing is performed by #shadowsdk of applications, but is unintentional: these classes are embedded for retro-compatibility purposes or because the developer added a library already present in Android.